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Abstract
A pure hedonic game describes the situation where player’s utility depends
only on the identity of the members of the group he belongs to. The paper
provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of core-partition
in hedonic games. The condition is based on a new concept of balancedness,
called pivotal balancedness. Pivotal balancedness involves especially the notion
pivotal distribution that associates to each coalition a sub-group of players in
the coalition. Then, we proceed to a review of several suﬃcient conditions for
core-partition existence showing how the results can be uniﬁed through suitably
chosen pivotal distributions.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C71.
Keywords: hedonic game, group formation, core-partition, balancedness.
R´ esum´ e
La classe des jeux h´ edonistiques purs mod´ elisent des situations d’interactions
sociales o` u l’utilit´ e de chaque joueur d´ epend seulement de l’identit´ e du groupe
auquel il appartient. L’article propose une condition n´ ecessaire et suﬃsante pour
l’existence de partition stable, au sens du cœur, dans les jeux h´ edonistiques.
La condition, appel´ ee balancement avec pivot, raﬃne la condition usuelle de
balancement. Elle fait notamment appel ` a des distributions pivots qui, ` a chaque
coalition, associe un sous-groupe de joueurs dans la coalition. Nous uniﬁons les
r´ esultats de la litt´ erature sur les partitions stables en identiﬁant des distributions
pivots ad´ equates.
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Mots-cl´ es : jeu h´ edonistique, formation de groupes, cœur-partition, balance-
ment.
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Dr` eze and Greenberg [10] called hedonic aspect the dependence of a player’s
utility on the identity of the members of his group. In many diﬀerent areas of
economics, the hedonic aspect plays a central role since it intends to explain
the formation and the existence of groups, clubs and communities. As example,
the utility over public goods of an individual in a group depends both on the
consumption level of the public good and on the identity of the members in the
group.
A hedonic game describes the situation where player’s utility depends only
on that hedonic aspect.
The model of hedonic games has been formally given and studied in Banerjee
et al. [2] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5] (earlier game theoretical analysis
in that line also includes Greenberg and Weber [11] and Kaneko and Wooders
[12]). Following these contributions, there has been a strong interest for the
theoretical analysis of hedonic games and as well as a revival in the analysis of
public goods that falls into the class of hedonic games. To illustrate the latter,
quote the recent contribution of Bogomolnaia et al. [4] who study the resolution
of public project location under some speciﬁc cost sharing rules. In that case,
the utility of a coalition is fully determined by the identity of the members of
the coalition.
Here, we turn to the theoretical analysis of hedonic games, speciﬁcally to
the existence of core-partition which is the natural cooperative game solution
in hedonic setting. A core-partition is a partition of the players such that there
is no coalition of players where each player in the coalition is better oﬀ (with
respect to his utility in the coalition) than in the partition. Hence in essence,
the core-partition has the same requirement as the core solution in coalition
structure studied in general cooperative games and deﬁned ﬁrst by Aumann
and Dr` eze [1].
The paper provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of
core-partition in hedonic games.
In the literature, authors have alternatively oﬀered suﬃcient conditions for
existence by specifying restrictions on feasible coalitions, individual preferences
or preference proﬁle. In the case of restrictions on feasible coalitions, the exis-
tence and the uniqueness of core-partition is characterized by Papai [13], (see
also Greenberg and Weber [11] with consecutive games). In the case of restric-
tions on individual preferences, the existence is studied by Burani and Zwicker
[8], Dimitrov et al. [9] and Papai [14]. In our paper, the restrictions hold on
the whole preference proﬁle.1 In that general line, the contributions are due to
Banerjee et al. [2] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5], where they show mainly
two disconnected approaches to deduce the existence of core-partition in hedonic
1The restrictions on preference proﬁle is the most general line to deal with conditions for
existence of core-partition. Obviously, a restriction on individual preferences is a restriction
on the preference proﬁle. Second, restrictions on feasible coalitions can be restated on the











































In a ﬁrst approach, it has been noticed that a hedonic game admits a repre-
sentation in terms of NTU games (games with Non Transferable Utility). Then
it follows that Scarf’s balancedness condition [16] in NTU games provides a
suﬃcient condition for the existence of core-partition in the associated hedonic
game. As usual in many economic models, Scarf’s condition provides a power-
ful result for core-like solutions, while the diﬃculty with that condition is the
limited interpretative range of the balancedness.
A second approach is based on more interpretative mechanisms. The idea
is to involve the presence of sub-groups of players in each coalition that plays a
particular role. For instance in Banerjee et al. [2], a top coalition of a coalition
is a subset of the coalition such that each agent in the subset is better oﬀ than
in other subsets of the coalition. Banerjee et al [2] show that the existence of
at least one top coalition in each coalition of the game guarantees the existence
of a core-partition.
We deﬁne a new notion of balancedness, called pivotal balancedness, that
gathers the above two leading intuitions. To deﬁne the notion, consider the
notion of balanced family given by [6, 17]. A family of coalition is said to be
balanced if for each coalition in the family there is a weight such that, for each
player, the weights of the coalitions to which he belongs sum to 1. To deﬁne
a pivotally balanced family, one ﬁrst associates to each coalition a non-empty
subset of players in the coalition, the resulting family is a pivotal distribution.
Given a family of coalitions, the restriction of the pivotal distribution on the
elements of the family is the pivotal distribution of the family. Now, a family of
coalitions is said to be pivotally balanced if its pivotal distribution is balanced.
In the setting of hedonic games, one deduces naturally a deﬁnition for piv-
otally balanced game. The game is said to be pivotally balanced if there exists
a pivotal distribution such that for each pivotally balanced family there exists
a partition of set of players such that each player prefers his coalition in the
partition than his worst coalition in the family.
Our main result, Theorem 2, states that a hedonic game admits a core-
partition if and only if the game is pivotally balanced. To describe further the
range of our result in the literature on core-like solutions, let us recall that,
for a TU game (Transferable Utility), Bondareva [6] and Shapley [17] proved
that the core is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced, using the notion
of balanced family. For a NTU game, Predtetchinski and Herings [15] and
Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e [7] proved that the core is non-empty if and only if the
game is Π-balanced, where Π-balancedness is a general notion of balancedness
deﬁned relatively to a payoﬀ. While the hedonic game may be viewed as a
NTU game, here we do not appeal the general notion of Π-balancedness. It
stems from the fact that the associated NTU game admits a very particular
geometrical structure. Clearly, to characterize the core in hedonic games one
needs the intermediary concept of pivotal balancedness.
In Section 2, the formal model is given. We ﬁrst recall the existence result
of Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5] based on balancedness. Then, we deﬁne the









































7paper, Theorem 2. A ﬁrst intuition about the result is given through a very
simple example of hedonic game that is pivotally balanced but not balanced.
In Section 3, we review several suﬃcient conditions for the existence of core-
partition already established in the literature. In particular, we show that the
properties of ordinal balancedness [5], consecutiveness [5], top coalition [2] all
imply pivotal balancedness. To demonstrate these results, we construct explic-
itly the appropriate pivotal distributions in each case.
Section 4 contains the proof of Theorem 2. To prepare the proof, we describe
the representation of hedonic games in terms of NTU games. The NTU game
modelling of hedonic games has been already used in Banerjee et al. [2] and
Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5] to deduce the existence of core-partition through
Scarf’s theorem. The diﬀerence here is that Scarf’s result is not general enough
to prove our result. Instead, we use a result of Billera [3] for b-balanced games.
2 The model and the result
Let N be the ﬁnite set of players and N be the set of all non-empty subsets of
N. A group of players S ∈ N is called a coalition. Given B ⊂ N and i ∈ N,
let B(i) = {S ∈ B | i ∈ S} be the set of coalitions in B that contain i. A
partition of N is a family π = {S1,...,SK} (K ≤ |N|) where ∪K
k=1Sk = N, and
Sk ∩ S` = ∅ for any k,` ∈ {1,...,K}, k 6= `. The family of all partition in N is
denoted Π(N). For any partition π ∈ Π(N) and any player i ∈ N let π(i) be
the unique coalition such that i ∈ π(i). For each S ∈ N, 1S ∈ R
N is the vector
with coordinates equal to 1 in S and equal to 0 outside S.
Deﬁnition 1 A hedonic game is a pair (N;(i)i∈N), where i is a reﬂexive,
complete, and transitive binary relation on N(i).2
In the sequel, a hedonic game will be denoted (N,), where  is the proﬁle
of individual preferences.
Deﬁnition 2 Given π ∈ Π(N), a coalition T ∈ N blocks π if T i π(i) for
each i ∈ T. A core-partition is a partition π∗ that is blocked by no coalition.
Let us ﬁrst recall the notion of balancedness. A family of coalitions B ⊂ N
is balanced if for each S ∈ B there exists a balancing weight λS ∈ R+, such that P
S∈B λS1S = 1. The next deﬁnition is due to Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5].
Deﬁnition 3 Let (N,) be a hedonic game. The game is ordinally balanced if
for each balanced family B there exists a partition π ∈ P(N) such that for each
j ∈ N, there is S ∈ B(j) such that π(j) j S.
The following result provides a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a
core-partition in hedonic games. It is the counterpart of Scarf ’s Theorem [16]
in the hedonic setting.
2Strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence relation are denoted by i and ∼i respec-









































7Theorem 1 (Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)) Let (N,) be a hedonic
game. The game admits a core-partition if it is ordinally balanced.
The condition is not necessary as shown in the following example due to
Banerjee et al [2].
{1,2} 1 {1,3} 1 {1,2,3} 1 {1}
{1,2} 2 {2,3} 2 {1,2,3} 2 {2}
{1,3} 3 {2,3} 3 {1,2,3} 3 {3}
The above hedonic game admits a unique core-partition: π∗ = {{1,2},{3}}.
But for the balanced family B = {{1,2},{2,3},{1,3}} (consider the weights
λS = 1
2 for each S ∈ B), S  π∗(3) = {3} for all S ∈ B(3). Thus, the game is
not ordinally balanced.
Our objective in this paper is to provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the existence of a core-partition in hedonic games. Our result is based on a
reﬁnement of the usual notion of balanced family. The reﬁnement involves the
notion of pivotal distribution.
Deﬁnition 4 A family I = (I(S))S∈N is called pivotal distribution if for each
S ∈ N, I(S) is a non-empty group of agents such that I(S) ⊂ S. The set of all
pivotal distributions is denoted by I.
The new notions of I-balanced family and pivotal balanced game can be
deﬁned now.
Deﬁnition 5 Given a pivotal distribution I ∈ I. A family of coalitions B ⊂ N
is I-balanced if the family (I(S))S∈B is balanced.
Scarf’s notion of balanced family coincides with the particular case of I-
balanced family for a full pivotal distribution, i.e. I(S) = S for each S ∈ N.
Hence, the notion of I-balancedness restricts clearly the number of balanced
families.
Remark 1 There is another equivalent formulation for I-balanced family. Given
a pivotal distribution I ∈ I, a family of coalitions B ⊂ N is I-balanced if for
each S ∈ B there exists λS ∈ R+ such that
P
S∈B λS1I(S) = 1. It leads back to
a b-balanced family ` a la Billera [3], where bS = 1I(S) for each S ∈ N and b = 1
(See Section 4 for a formal deﬁnition).
Deﬁnition 6 Let (N,) be a hedonic game. The game is pivotally balanced if
there exists a pivotal distribution I ∈ I such that for each I-balanced family B
there exists a coalition partition π ∈ P(N) such that for each j ∈ N, there is









































7Let us come back to the example given by Banerjee et al. [2]. Consider
the following pivotal distribution I where I({123}) = {1,2}, I({1,2}) = {1,2},
I({1,3}) = {1}, I({2,3}) = {2}, I({i}) = {i} for each i = 1,...,3. First note
that the problematic family {{1,2},{2,3},{1,3}} is not any more I-balanced.
Actually in this example, the I-balanced families include necessarily the single-
ton {3} since it is the only coalition S that satisﬁes 3 ∈ I(S). Then, considering
the partition π = {{1,2},{3}}, the game is pivotally balanced since {1,2} is a
maximal element for both players 1 and 2.
We state now our main result. The proof is given in Section 4 as we need a
representation in terms of NTU games for the if part of the proof (see Theorem
3).
Theorem 2 Let (N,) be a hedonic game. The game admits a core-partition
if and only if it is pivotally balanced.
3 About suﬃcient conditions
We review diﬀerent properties that guarantee the existence of core-partition.
Given our main result, each of them can be restated as a condition of pivotal
balancedness. We describe two cases: consecutiveness, top coalition property,
where the pivotal is explicitly constructed and the game is shown to be pivotally
balanced. To proceed with the review, we follow mainly the contributions of
Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5] and Banerjee et al. [2].
3.1 Consecutiveness and ordinal balancedness
In Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5], the authors identify two classes of conditions for
the existence of core-partition in hedonic games: ordinal balancedness condition,
as presented in Theorem 1, and consecutiveness properties. We have already
seen that ordinal balancedness coincides with I-balancedness in the particular
case where I(S) = S for any S ∈ N.
Turn now to consecutiveness and weak consecutiveness properties. An or-
dering of players is a bijection f : N → N. A coalition S ∈ N is consecutive
with respect to an ordering of players f, if f(i) < f(j) < f(k) with i,k ∈ S
implies j ∈ S. A hedonic game is consecutive if there exists an ordering of
players f such S i {i} for some i implies that S is consecutive with respect to
f. A hedonic game (N,) is weakly consecutive if there exists an ordering of
players f such that whenever a partition π ∈ Π(N) is blocked by some coalition
T, there exists T0 that is consecutive with respect to f that blocks π.
3.1.1 The pivotal distribution: case 1
Let us show how the property of consecutiveness implies pivotal balancedness.
Let f be the ordering given by assumption. For each S ∈ N, let I(S) be a









































7to f) and I(S) i {i} for all i ∈ I(S).3 One can show that the game is pivotally
balanced with respect to that pivotal distribution.
Let B be a I-balanced family. Then, the family (I(S))S∈B is a balanced
family of consecutive coalitions. From a classical argument taken from Green-
berg and Weber [11, Proposition 1, p.109], we know that any balanced family
of consecutive coalitions contains a partition. Hence, one deduces that I(S)S∈B
contains a partition π ∈ Π(N). Let i ∈ N, if all S ∈ B(i) are consecutive it
follows that either π(i) = T, for some T ∈ B(i), then π(i) i T or there exists
T ∈ B(i) such that {i} i T then, from the construction of I, π(i) i T. If
there is a non consecutive coalition S ∈ B(i) then {i} i S by assumption. It
follows that π(i) i S from the construction of I. Thus, the game is pivotally
balanced.
3.2 Top-coalitions
Banerjee et al.[2] introduce the top coalition properties. They are also suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of core-partition in hedonic games. Given a coalition
U ∈ N, a non-empty subset S ⊂ U is a top coalition of U if for any i ∈ S and
any T ⊂ U with i ∈ T we have S i T. A game satisﬁes the top coalition
property if for any coalition U ∈ N, there exists a top-coalition of U.
Banerjee et al. [2] also deﬁned a weak top coalition property. We refer the
reader to [2, Deﬁnition 14] for further details. Note however that the construc-
tion of the pivotal distribution would be based on the same principle as the
argument below
3.2.1 The pivotal distribution: case 2
To obtain pivotal balancedness from top coalition property, we follow [2] and
let π1 be a top coalition of N, π2 a top coalition of N \π1, ..., πk a top coalition
of N \ ∪{k0<k}πk0 and so on. The procedure yelds eventually a partition π =
(π1,...,πK) ∈ Π(N) in K ≤ |N| steps. For each S ∈ N, let kS be the smallest
number such that πkS ∩ S 6= ∅ and set I(S) = πkS ∩ S. Then, the game is
pivotally balanced with respect to that distribution.
Indeed, let B be a I-balanced family. By way of contradiction, suppose that
the game is not pivotally balanced. Let i ∈ N such that for each S ∈ B(i),
S i π(i). Then necessarily S 6⊂ N \ ∪{k0<k}πk0 for k such that πk = π(i),
otherwise πk is not a top coalition of N\∪{k0<k}πk0. Thus, there exists j ∈ S∩πk0
with k0 < k. Then, i / ∈ I(S) from the construction of I. One deduces that for
each S ∈ B(i), i / ∈ I(S) which is in contradiction with the fact that B is I-
balanced. Then, the game is pivotally balanced.









































74 NTU games representation
To prove Theorem 2, one needs to use NTU games representation of hedonic
games. Let (N,) be a hedonic game. Following a strategy set up by Banerjee
et al. [2] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5], let us a deﬁne an associate NTU-
hedonic game. First, we deﬁne a utility proﬁle consistent with (N,), for each
i ∈ N, let ui : N(i) → R be such that, for each S,T ∈ N(i), ui(S) ≥ ui(T)
iﬀ S i T.4 For each S ∈ N, let VS = {x ∈ R
N | xi ≤ ui(S) for all i ∈ S}
be the set of feasible payoﬀs of S, and V = {x ∈ R
N | ∃π ∈ Π(N),xi ≤
ui(π(i)) for all i ∈ N} be the set of payoﬀs such that there exists a partition
for which the payoﬀs are feasible.5 The family of payoﬀ sets ((VS)S∈N,V ) is
called NTU-hedonic game and is denoted V (N,). The core of V (N,) is the
set ∂V \ int ∪S∈N VS.6
Theorem 3 Given a hedonic game (N,), the following propositions are equiv-
alent:
1. The game amits a core-partition.
2. The NTU-hedonic game V (N,) has a non-empty core.
3. The game is pivotally balanced.
Remark 2 The statement of Theorem 3 comes closer to a result of Kaneko and
Wooders [12, Theorem 2.7]. The authors provide a characterization in terms of
partitioning condition for the non-empty core in partition structure for a class
of NTU games with restriction on feasible coalitions. However, their result is
not comparable with Theorem 3.
In Billera [3], the notion of b-balancedness is deﬁned. For each S ∈ N, let
bS ∈ R
N \ {0} such that bi
S ∈ R+ if i ∈ S and bi
S = 0 otherwise, and let
b ∈ R
N
++. A family of coalition B ⊂ N is b-balanced if for each S ∈ B, there
exists λS ∈ R+ such that
P
S∈B λSbS = b. Given the hedonic game (N,), the
associate NTU-hedonic game V (N,) is b-balanced if for any b-balanced family
B ⊂ N, ∩S∈BVS ⊂ V . The result of Billera [3] implies that any b-balanced
NTU-hedonic game has a non-empty core. The result is used in the proof of
Theorem 3.
Proof.
(1) ⇔ (2) Obvious, from the construction of the game V (N,). 
4Such a utility proﬁle always exists since the number of coalitions is ﬁnite. Note also that
we need only one utility proﬁle, but in general the proﬁle is not uniquely deﬁned.
5Usually to deﬁne the game in partition structure, one sets VN = V and the set V is
omitted. Our formulation here is equivalent and used for convenience. In [7], the distinction
between V and VN has deeper implications.









































7(1) ⇒ (3) Consider a core-partition π∗ of (N,) and construct the pivotal
distribution. For each S ∈ N, deﬁne I(S) = {i ∈ S | π∗(i) i S}. Necessarily
the sets I(S), S ∈ N, are non-empty since π∗ is a core-partition. Next, suppose
that the game is not pivotally balanced with respect to I. Thus, there exist
a family B ⊂ N and λS ∈ R+ for each S ∈ B with
P
S∈B λS1I(S) = 1, and
k ∈ N such that for all S ∈ B(k), S k π∗(k). From the construction of the
pivotal distribution, one deduces that k 6∈ I(S) for all S ∈ B(k). Hence, B is
not I-balanced since (
P
S∈B(k) λS1I(S))k = 0 < 1. It leads to a contradiction.

(3) ⇒ (2) Suppose that (3) holds true and let I ∈ I be the associated pivotal
distribution, we show ﬁrst that V (N,) is b-balanced, the vectors (bS)S∈N
being given by (1I(S))S∈N and b = 1. Let B be a b-balanced family of coalitions
and x ∈ ∩S∈BVS. From Remark 1, B is I-balanced. From (3) there exists a
partition π∗ such that such that for all i ∈ N, there is S ∈ B(i) such that
ui(S) ≤ ui(π∗(i)). Since x ∈ VS for all S ∈ B, it holds that for all i ∈ N and
S ∈ B(i), xi ≤ ui(S). Then, one gets xi ≤ ui(π∗(i)) for all i ∈ N, i.e. x ∈ V .
Hence, the game V (N,) is b-balanced ` a la Billera [3]. From the non-emptiness
result given in [3], the game V (N,) has a non-empty core. 
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